Class, Classes, and Classic Race Baiting: What’s in a Definition? by Onwuachi-Willig, Angela & Fricke, Amber
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
2011 
Class, Classes, and Classic Race Baiting: What’s in a Definition? 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig 
Boston University School of Law 
Amber Fricke 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law and Race Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Amber Fricke, Class, Classes, and Classic Race Baiting: What’s in a Definition?, 
88 Denver University Law Review 807 (2011). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/304 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship 
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at 
Boston University School of Law. For more information, 
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu. 
807 
CLASS, CLASSES, AND CLASSIC RACE-BAITING: WHAT’S 
IN A DEFINITION? 
ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG† 
AMBER FRICKE‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
In his article Class in American Legal Education, Professor Richard 
Sander highlights the lack of class diversity within law schools in the 
United States, particularly within elite law schools.1 As Sander points 
out, law students tend to come from relatively elite class backgrounds, 
and Sander urges law schools to pursue class-based affirmative action, 
rather than race-based affirmative action, in their admissions processes.2 
As a general matter, we agree with Professor Sander that class di-
versity within a law school and within the legal community is a laudable 
goal. Class-based affirmative action is neither an unnecessary nor unwar-
ranted proposal. A number of the arguments asserted in favor of racial 
diversity in Grutter v. Bollinger3 also may apply to class diversity. For 
example, just like racial diversity, class diversity among students can 
contribute to a robust exchange of ideas on legal issues.4 Additionally, to 
the extent that law schools “represent the training ground for a large 
number of our Nation’s leaders” and to the extent that we want to “culti-
vate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry,” class 
diversity, like race diversity, may signal to all citizens that the law school 
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 1. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 637 
(2011). 
 2. While Professor Sander does not explicitly argue for the repeal of race-based affirmative 
action in his article, he suggests, through his arguments, that the flaws in many race-based affirma-
tive action admissions policies are cause for elimination of the policy, not reform of the policy. Most 
tellingly, Sander states, “As we have seen, law schools could do a great deal to foster more SES 
diversity without using class-based preferences at all. But there is much to commend going further, 
and using mild SES preferences as at least partial substitute for current racial preferences.” Id. at 
664 (emphasis added).  
 3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 4. See id. at 329. 
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path to leadership is open to people from a broad range of class back-
grounds.5 Indeed, Sander is not the first, nor will he be the last, law pro-
fessor to address the importance of class diversity within higher educa-
tion. For example, in their book The Miner’s Canary: Enlisting Race, 
Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy, Professors Lani Guinier and 
Gerald Torres examine the benefits of coalitions around “political race” 
that have enabled barriers to higher education at state universities to 
crumble for both disadvantaged white and minority students through the 
Texas Ten Percent Plan.6 Additionally, Guinier, in her article Admissions 
Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic 
Ideals, analyzes how measures for merit in the admissions process corre-
late more with factors such as parents’ education, grandparents’ socio-
economic status, racial identity, and geographic location than they do 
with future academic performance.7 Similarly, in her article Assessing 
Class-Based Affirmative Action, Professor Deborah Malamud carefully 
analyzes the idea of class-based affirmative action and its potential effec-
tiveness or ineffectiveness at addressing economic inequality.8 Finally, in 
the article The Admission of Legacy Blacks, one of us, Professor Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, studies the complexities of class as related to race and 
national origin and ethnicity for Blacks9 in the admissions game, encour-
aging institutions to account for socioeconomic status, race, and national 
origin in their processes.10 
In this Article, we do not take issue with Sander’s identification of 
class diversity as a necessary point for discussion and inclusion among 
law professors and deans. Rather, we take issue with the manner in 
which Sander sets up the discussion about law school affirmative action 
as an either-or proposition, with class on one end and race on the other, 
as though the two concerns are mutually exclusive of and incompatible 
with each other. More specifically, we contest Sander’s definitions of the 
words “class” and “socioeconomic status” and, in many ways, his use of 
those words as interchangeable terms in Class in American Legal Educa-
  
 5. See id. at 332. 
 6. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING 
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 67–75 (2002). 
 7. Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our De-
mocratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 146–51 (2003). 
 8. Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452, 
454–71 (1997).  
 9. Throughout this article, the words “Black” and “White” are capitalized when used as 
nouns to describe a racialized group; however, these terms are not capitalized when used as adjec-
tives. Also, the term “Blacks” is used instead of the term “African Americans” because the term 
“Blacks” is more inclusive. See Journal of Blacks in Higher Educ. Found., Why “Black” and Not 
“African American”?, 3 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 18, 18–19 (1994). Additionally, “[i]t is more 
convenient to invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white than say, between 
African-American and Northern European-American, which would be necessary to maintain seman-
tic symmetry between the two typologies.” Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in 
Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4 (1992). 
 10. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. 
REV. 1141 (2007).  
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tion (although such interchangeable use is frequently employed in legal 
scholarship, even by the authors).11 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary de-
fines “class” as “a group sharing the same economic or social status”12 
and defines “socioeconomic” as “of, relating to, or involving a combina-
tion of social and economic factors.”13 Based on these definitions, it is 
clear that while one’s class may arguably (though not convincingly) be 
defined solely in economic terms, one’s socioeconomic status (SES) nec-
essarily includes social factors such as race.14 In fact, we find Malamud’s 
definition of class and economic disadvantage in her article Assessing 
Class-Based Affirmative Action most convincing. Like Malamud, at least 
with respect to the category of “class,” we “do not mean that [a person] 
falls below a predetermined absolute threshold of economic attainment” 
when we say that “that a person is economically disadvantaged”; 
“[i]nstead, [we mean that] one is economically disadvantaged in [our] 
sense of the term when one has fewer economic goods than do members 
of some relevant comparison group.”15 In this vein, we question a num-
ber of Sander’s comparisons and framings of class and socioeconomic 
status within his article. For instance, when Sander speaks of students of 
“relatively elite backgrounds,” he rarely notes to which groups these 
“elite backgrounds” are relative; he never compares, for example, the 
black law students from “relatively elite backgrounds” with their white, 
law school peers of “relatively elite backgrounds.”16 Along those same 
lines, Sander’s groupings of law school students’ parents by class often 
seems to be comparing apples to oranges, such as parents who are regis-
tered nurses to those who are doctors. 
Finally, we reject what we view as Sander’s misguided attempts to 
institute class-based affirmative action in lieu of race-based affirmative 
action.17 In so doing, we explain why many of Sander’s arguments in 
favor of substituting race-based affirmative action with class-based af-
firmative action are flawed. We also note numerous substantive reasons 
why law schools must continue to pay attention to race. Contrary to what 
  
 11. Sander, supra note 1, at 633–34 (defining “class” and “socioeconomic status” by refer-
ence to one’s income, education, and occupation, and using the two terms interchangeably “when 
statistics are involved”). 
 12. Class, M-W.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/class (last visited June 08, 
2011) (emphasis added).  
 13. Socioeconomic, M-W.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/socioeconomic 
(last visited June 08, 2011) (emphasis added).  
 14. Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1847, 1866–94 (1996). 
 15. Malamud, supra note 8, at 453. 
 16. Sander, supra note 1, at 633 (discussing the prevalence of students from “relatively elite 
backgrounds” in top law schools).  
 17. Race-based affirmative action in legal education usually applies to black Americans, 
Latinos, Native Americans, and some Asian ethnicities. However, we have chosen to focus most of 
our emphasis on black Americans, considering that (1) Sander also puts great attention on black 
Americans, (2) the greatest wealth of available scholarship is on black Americans, and (3) black 
Americans are arguably the original, primary intended recipients of affirmative action, considering 
our nation’s past history with slavery, Jim Crow laws, and the Civil Rights Movement.  
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Sander’s article suggests, race and racism still matter within our society, 
and in a way that supports the maintenance of race-based affirmative 
action within law schools. In the end, we reject Sander’s contention that 
class-based affirmative action would produce similar racial diversity 
within law schools.18 
Overall, in this Article, we briefly lay out each of our challenges to 
Sander’s arguments in Class in American Legal Education. In Part I, we 
first address the very problems that Sander’s article highlights about the 
difficulties of defining class and SES, problems that may make class-
based affirmative action programs less feasible and effective than Sander 
suggests. In so doing, we identify what we consider to be defects in 
Sander’s class/SES groupings. We also highlight the complexities around 
class and race that already exist within law student populations, answer-
ing in part the important questions about to whom black law students are 
“relatively” advantaged or disadvantaged. In Part II, we focus on re-
sponding to Sander’s substantive arguments against race-based affirma-
tive action, demonstrating why class-based affirmative action is an in-
adequate substitute and why race-based affirmative action is still needed. 
I. WHO’S GOT CLASS? THE DIFFICULTIES OF MEASURING 
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS THAT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE 
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM PROFESSOR SANDER’S DATA  
In making his arguments for the adoption of class-based affirmative 
action as opposed to race-based affirmative action, Sander relies on the 
following two factors to determine each student subject’s class/SES: the 
level of education of the parent(s) of the student and the occupation of 
the parent(s) of the student.19 In so doing, however, Professor Sander 
does not adequately discuss the inherent difficulties in measuring class 
(or what he also refers to as SES) and demarcating persons by class. In-
stead, Sander overlooks or minimizes the racial implications of his 
choices in determining class, even as he admits several flaws in his data. 
He also fails to address various concerns about measuring students’ SES 
that other legal scholars such as Malamud have raised.  
In this Part, we—neither of whom is an empiricist—first address 
what we view as Sander’s avoidance and minimizing of the real conse-
quences that flow from the admitted flaws in his means for measuring 
SES as well as the consequences that flow from what we view as fatal 
flaws in Sander’s methods for demarcating SES quintiles. Thereafter, we 
identify what is lost in the analysis because of Sander’s failure to discuss 
the inherent difficulties of measuring class and demarcating persons by 
class. In particular, we highlight what we believe is lost in Sander’s 
  
 18. See Sander, supra note 1, at 660–64. 
 19. Except where specifically noted in the remaining sections of this Article, we use the terms 
“class” and “SES” as Sander does—interchangeably. 
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analysis as a result of his failure to address intergenerational wealth and 
account for the differences between Blacks and Whites at each defined 
SES level.  
A. Undercounting, Undervaluing, and Underestimating Difference 
As noted above, neither one of us is an empiricist, and as a result, 
we are not well-positioned to contest Sander’s data from that angle. 
However, even as non-empiricists, we have serious questions about the 
validity of Sander’s conclusions in light of the admitted flaws in his data 
and in light of some of the assumptions that Sander makes in pushing his 
arguments. 
For example, we wonder to what extent Sander’s analysis is valid 
when the SES status of black students is highly likely to be overrepre-
sented for a significant portion of the black law student sample, a sample 
that is already, as Sander notes, quite modest.20 Sander acknowledges 
that one flaw in his measurements is that “the SES status of students 
from single-parent families will tend to be overstated by the approach 
used here”21 and that “Blacks disproportionately come from single-parent 
families, whose income will usually be lower—despite high educational 
and occupational prestige—than otherwise similar two-parent fami-
lies.”22 Nevertheless, Sander minimizes the potential effect of this flaw, 
noting that “none of the data sources [he] know[s] of on the SES of the 
general population of law students help us take these factors into ac-
count.”23 Yet, a quick review of the data regarding the percentages of 
black and white children who live in single-parent households raises se-
rious questions about whether Sander’s analysis in his article can even be 
legitimately run without taking such factors in account. First, as Sander 
concedes himself, considering that a more accurate predictor of SES 
would include all persons in a household who contribute to the ex-
penses,24 Sander’s averaging of SES scores between parents greatly 
overstates the SES of single-parent families. Second, and more impor-
tantly, Sander’s risk of overstating privilege for single-parent households 
in his study is 2.8 times as high for black children as it is for white chil-
dren.25 After all, black children are significantly more likely to be raised 
in single-parent homes than white students—at a rate of 67% versus 
24%.26 
  
 20. Sander, supra note 1, at 650. 
 21. Id. at 636–37. 
 22. Id. at 652.  
 23. Id.  
 24. See Malamud, supra note 14, at 1878–79. 
 25. See Kids Count Data Ctr., Data Across States: Children in Single-Parent Families by 
Race (Percent) – 2009, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/acrossstates/ 
Rankings.aspx?ind=107 (last visited June 08, 2011). 
 26. Id. 
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Similarly, while Sander notes that his “method [may] be too conser-
vative in characterizing the eliteness of law students . . . [because] many 
law students’ parents have not just bachelor degrees, but bachelor de-
grees from very elite schools,”27 he again fails to identify and discuss the 
racial implications for such a flaw. Indeed, this flaw is not just likely to 
understate the eliteness of law students, but it is specifically more likely 
to overstate the eliteness of black law students and consequently under-
state the differences between the eliteness of black law students and 
white law students. Given the significant blatant discrimination in educa-
tion against the parents and grandparents of today’s black law students, 
such law students’ parents are less likely than their white peers to have 
bachelor degrees from very elite schools. As one example, racial minor-
ity students today have a vastly lower likelihood of benefiting from leg-
acy programs. At Texas A&M University in 2002—a school that no 
longer exercises legacy preferences—legacy preferences allowed for the 
enrollment of 321 white students who otherwise would not have been 
admitted, but only three Blacks and twenty-five Latina/os in this cate-
gory.28 In fact, Blacks were not permitted admission to Texas A&M Uni-
versity until 1963.29 Similarly, at the University of Virginia, one report in 
2003 indicated that 91 percent of the legacy applicants who were ac-
cepted on an early-decision basis were white, while only 1.6 percent of 
such admits were black, 0.5 percent were Latina/o, and 1.6 percent were 
Asian-American.30 At one point in his article, Sander mentions legacy 
preferences as a factor that may have a negative impact on low SES stu-
dents,31 but even then, Sander fails to acknowledge the racial implica-
tions of such legacy preferences.  
Finally, we contend that Sander’s methodology is flawed with re-
gard to more than just his tools of measurement. In deciding where to 
insert “meaningful breaks” as Malamud would term them,32 Professor 
Sander has created a misleading heavily weighted high SES scheme. For 
example, a female registered nurse is accorded an occupational score of 
75 out of 100, which places her in the high SES quartile.33 Yet, such a 
  
 27. Sander, supra note 1, at 637.  
 28. Todd Ackerman, Legislators Slam A&M Over Legacy Admissions, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 4, 
2004, at A1, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=200_3722913; see 
also Gates Ends Legacy Role in Admissions, BATTALION ONLINE (Jan. 16, 2004), 
http://www.thebatt.com/2.8485/gates-ends-legacy-role-in-admissions-1.1207693 (containing a 
statement in which President Robert Gates asserted that “Texas A&M will no longer award points 
for legacy in the admissions review process”). 
 29. Michael King, Naked City: Texas A&M’s Racial Legacy, AUSTIN CHRON. (Jan. 16, 2004), 
http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/Issue/print?oid=oid%3A193354. 
 30. Daniel Golden, Family Ties: Preference for Alumni Children in College Admissions 
Draws Fire—Policy, Aiding Mainly Whites, Gets Embroiled in Debate Over Affirmative Action—
Critical to Schools’ Donations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2003, at A1. 
 31. Sander, supra note 1, at 658. 
 32. Malamud, supra note 14, at 1879. 
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placement does not seem to accord with what the average person would 
consider high SES. Although there is wide variation in measuring class,34 
the fact that Professor Sander classifies a registered nurse as high SES35 
is striking because one does not even need a bachelor’s degree to become 
a registered nurse. Indeed, a female registered nurse without a bachelor’s 
degree would not meet the criteria for being middle-class according to 
prominent sociologist Thomas Shapiro, who contends that a middle-class 
classification according to education requires that at least one person in 
the household have a bachelor’s degree.36 By creating such a broad cate-
gory of high SES persons, Sander undervalues the comparative privilege 
of high SES persons by race, considering that Blacks heavily populate 
the occupations at the bottom end of that quartile.37 Indeed, Sander’s 
misleading SES scheme has far-reaching implications all throughout his 
analysis because it relies on groupings that may be inaccurate and lack-
ing in meaning, thus making any comparisons that he makes between the 
various racial and class groups unreliable. 
Moreover, in comparing the relative representation of racial and so-
cioeconomic groups of law students to the general population, Sander 
proceeds as though the groups of minority students and low-SES students 
are mutually exclusive of each other. We suspect others will respond 
much like we did when reading Sander’s article, asking: “What would 
Table 5 look like if the SES groups (even under Sander’s groupings, but 
preferably under one that does not classify both registered nurses and 
doctors under the same SES group) were divided by both race and 
class?” After all, as Sander highlights at a different point in his paper, 
“racial minorities are responsible for much of the small amount of SES 
diversity we can currently observe in law schools.”38 
B. Having Class and What That Means 
On top of the specific flaws in Sander’s data lay more general prob-
lems with his definitions of class and SES. Throughout his article, 
Sander fails to address various concerns that other legal scholars such as 
Malamud have raised about the messiness of measuring class and SES 
status.  
  
 33. Sander, supra note 1, at 636. Professor Sander adapts the CAMSIS scale, which ranks 
occupations, but adds his own percentile to it reasoning that “75% of employed women in this age 
cohort have lower CAMSIS codes, so registered nurses are assigned a percentile of 75.” Id. 
 34. THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW WEALTH 
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 87 (2004). 
 35. Sander, supra note 1, at 636. 
 36. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 88. 
 37. Id. at 89 (“The gap between whites and blacks grows using the occupational definition of 
the middle class because it does not have an income ceiling and thus includes proportionally more 
well-to-do families, and highly paid professionals and executives tend to be white. Conversely, 
employees in lower-middle-jobs—office workers, civil servants, and salespeople—are dispropor-
tionately black.”).  
 38. Sander, supra note 1, at 651. 
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1. The Difficulties of Defining Class/SES 
In several articles, Malamud has undertaken a comprehensive look 
at the inherent difficulties in devising a technically, morally, and cultur-
ally accurate class-based affirmative action program.39 In so doing, she 
has urged a structural, intergenerational approach to understanding eco-
nomic disadvantage, one that is cognizant of the limitations of most tra-
ditional indicia used to estimate economic disadvantage and that consid-
ers the intertwinement of race, gender, and class oppressions.40 For ex-
ample, Malamud asserts the following about defining and understanding 
class in the United States: 
Class is social in the dual sense that the class system is inherent in 
and perpetuated by the structure of economic relations in the society 
and that shared class position has the potential for being mobilized as 
the basis for both group identity and political action. Class is dia-
chronic in the triple sense that class position is (1) intergenerationally 
transmitted, (2) mediated through the strategic behavior of social ac-
tors over time, and (3) incapable of being understood without refer-
ence to patterns of change in the economic organization of the soci-
ety. 
 Finally, there is an alternative version of a belief in class, which 
builds on the meaning of class just described, but goes beyond it. In 
this view, class is said to interact with race, gender, and ethnicity 
(and perhaps other elements of social identity, such as place of resi-
dence) in interlocking and mutually defining structures, and it is their 
interaction that is seen to shape both consciousness and life chances. 
One of the many consequences of this view, if it is correct, is that 
class analysis can never be race- or gender-blind and therefore cannot 
strictly be viewed as an alternative to the traditional foci of antidis-
crimination law and policy.41 
Overall, Malamud suggests that, although the various elements of 
economic advantage are structurally intertwined, and all are needed to 
present a full picture, institutions can consider wealth, occupation, in-
come, education, consumption, and class consciousness (as well as race, 
gender, and ethnicity) in determining whether applicants should be the 
recipients of class-based affirmative action.42 At the same time, however, 
Malamud acknowledges and explains the individual limitations and ad-
vantages of each of these elements. For example, in describing wealth, 
she argues that, despite its ability to represent true inequality that is di-
rectly related to the availability of opportunities and its revelation of 
stark racial inequality, wealth is rarely revealed or utilized in studies.43 
  
 39. See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 14. 
 40. Id. at 1855–56.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 1870–85.  
 43. Id. at 1870–72. 
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She further notes that occupational status demonstrates the intergenera-
tional nature of class and its lack of mobility, but points out that there is 
not an agreed upon set of characteristics to classify occupations and that 
job titles may not represent true duties or prestige.44  
Thereafter, Malamud explains that, in contrast to wealth, while in-
come data is easily attainable and measurable, it makes economic mobil-
ity seem more accessible than it actually is.45 Furthermore, she points out 
that income is not accurately conveyed when given individually, but is 
more truly representative of SES when presented in the aggregate form 
for a family or household.  
Related to that, Malamud explicates that measuring class by educa-
tional status is a catch-22 because, although it is a significant indicator of 
opportunities available to a child, the complexity (such as the reputation 
of the school, the type of degree, whether the program is a night or day 
program) of education level cannot easily be taken into consideration, 
resulting in persons with less socially valued forms of education seeming 
more privileged than they actually are.46 Likewise, she notes that con-
sumption is a defining characteristic of class in American society, but 
that context dictates the importance of it, making, for example, a rural 
family’s consumption patterns difficult to compare to persons in urban 
areas.47  
Finally, Malamud warns of expecting students to have a shared 
class consciousness and to be willing and able to discuss a disadvantaged 
perspective based on class because many students—particularly by the 
graduate level—may lack a strong connection to their lower class roots.48 
In considering such elements of economic disadvantage, she also states 
that decisions must be made regarding how to classify a person’s disad-
vantage: gradationally, categorically, or relationally.49 Furthermore, she 
contends, a decision must be made on (1) whose class should be meas-
ured: that of an individual, a family, a household; (2) how to define a 
household; (3) how many generations should be included; and (4) how to 
treat children with parents in different households.50 Malamud argues 
that the most accurate way to gain an understanding of economic advan-
tage is by looking at the household as a whole, but also importantly notes 
that the economic advantages of grandparents may be outcome determi-
native of a child’s life opportunities.51 
  
 44. Id. at 1872–77. 
 45. Id. at 1877–80.  
 46. Id. at 1880–83. 
 47. Id. at 1883–85. 
 48. Id. at 1885–88. 
 49. Id. at 1863–65.  
 50. Id. at 1866–68.  
 51. Id. at 1866–69.  
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2. Acknowledging What’s Missing in Sander’s Measures of Socio-
economic Status 
In his article, Sander never grapples with any of the complexities of 
class that Malamud astutely lays out, choosing instead to rely on a more 
simplified definition. As a result, Sander fails to tell a complete story of 
SES.  
Overall, Sander claims to be measuring SES, but he never takes into 
consideration that racial status is highly important in American society, 
conferring both social and economic benefits and detriments. In fact, he 
seems to suggest that race itself comes with no disadvantages.52 His fail-
ure to adjust for the disparate racial impact of certain tools for measuring 
SES renders racial inequality invisible. Of particular significance is 
Sander’s unnecessary averaging of family household SES data (as noted 
in Part I.A),53 his exclusion of income data in relation to occupations,54 
and most starkly, his lack of data on wealth, which would more fully 
complete the stories about intergenerational wealth.55 The true SES of 
many black families is much lower than Sander emphasizes,56 thus 
greatly destabilizing his argument that high-SES blacks are being un-
fairly advantaged over low-SES whites. 
First, Sander’s determinants of SES lack income, which, in relation 
to occupation, renders pay differentials within occupations invisible. A 
person may hold a job within an occupation in the public sector or the 
private sector, the former which, on average, pays less.57 Considering 
Blacks are more heavily represented in the public sector as civil ser-
vants,58 their SES is likely overstated by not including the income com-
mensurate to the occupation, rendering any income disparity invisible.59  
But even more significant than Sander’s exclusion of income de-
terminants60 is his failure to account for and analyze wealth.61 While the 
average income gap between black families and white families has nar-
  
 52. See generally Sander, supra note 1 (centering his analysis around socioeconomic rather 
than racial diversity).  
 53. Id. at 636. 
 54. Id. at 633–36.  
 55. Id. at 652 (recognizing that wealth is important and that there is likely a racial disparity).   
 56. Although Professor Sander recognizes that the measures are likely to overstate the wealth 
of Blacks, he denies that such flaws significantly or fatally affect his classifications. See id. (recog-
nizing that the SES of Blacks is likely to be overstated).  
 57. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 89 (stating that Blacks are more likely to be civil servants who 
earn less, situating themselves as lower middle-class). 
 58. Malamud, supra note 14, at 1893. 
 59. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 89 (discussing the problem with occupation classifications 
when there is no income cap, which places clerical workers and executives in the same category 
despite great variance in economic advantage).  
 60. Id. at 36 (“Income is an indicator of the current status of racial inequality . . . wealth 
discloses the consequences of the racial patterning of opportunities.”).  
 61. Sander, supra note 1, at 650–53 (recognizing that wealth is important and that there is 
likely a racial disparity).  
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rowed to 64 cents to every dollar,62 the racial wealth gap is much 
greater.63 The impact of the legacy of racial oppression is evident by 
looking at the difference in wealth: “[B]lack families possess only 10 
cents for every dollar of wealth held by white families.”64 Although the 
exact spread of the racial wealth gap varies, “[w]hite households in every 
income quintile have significantly higher median wealth than similar-
earning black households.”65 
The source of the wealth gap is not fully explained by factors such 
as income,66 education, or job status—any of the traditional measures of 
class status.67 The racial wealth gap’s lack of correlation to traditional 
measures of class is illustrated by the finding that, if wealth is used as the 
measure “black families headed by professionals like doctors and law-
yers would be in the same class as white families headed by blue-collar 
workers, such as coal miners.”68 Considering that more merit-based dif-
ferences such as “education, jobs, and earnings” do not explain the racial 
wealth gap, it must be explained by non-merit-based sources such as 
“inheritance, institutional discrimination, and discriminatory public pol-
icy.”69 
This story of wealth is not one that can be or should be ignored 
when we are talking about class and SES distinctions in the affirmative 
action context. With regard to inheritance, white parents give funds to 
children earlier and in greater amounts.70 In his rather revealing book, 
The Hidden Cost of Being African American, sociologist Thomas Shapiro 
discusses the power of intergenerational wealth on racial inequality by 
discussing the prevalence of “transformative assets,” which serve as “in-
herited wealth lifting a family beyond their own achievements.”71 Trans-
formative assets include “down payments and closing costs for first-time 
homebuyers, college tuition payments, large cash gifts, and loans, as well 
as old-fashioned bequests at death.”72 
  
 62. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 7 (noting that the gap had narrowed following 1989 figures 
which found that a black family made only 55 cents for every dollar a white family made).  
 63. Id. at 32–33. 
 64. Id. at 47 (“The net worth of typical white families is $81,000 compared to $8,000 for 
black families.”). 
 65. Id. at 49. 
 66. Id. at 88–89 (stating that his study corroborated prior findings that income does not pre-
dict wealth levels).  
 67. Id. at 87. 
 68. Id. at 92. 
 69. Id. at 42.  
 70. Id. at 67–69. With respect to gifts from living family members, blacks and whites are just 
as likely to receive at all levels of wealth but “[t]he gift for the average white recipient was $2,824, 
compared to $805 for black families,” and “[b]lack families are just as willing to help their adult 
children, but their circumstances limit their ability to do so.” Id. at 68. Additionally, “among those 
fortunate enough to receive bequests, blacks received 8 cents of inheritance for every dollar inherited 
by whites.” Id. at 69. 
 71. Id. at 10. 
 72. Id. 
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Similarly, institutional discrimination and policy have played an 
enormous role in racial wealth differences that affect educational oppor-
tunities. For example, as a result of post-World War II governmental 
policies and societal trends, the modern middle-class was built. In fact, 
many middle-class white families were able to establish wealth through 
greater education and homeownership as a result of these policies and 
now are routinely able to leave their children inheritances as a result of 
these benefits.73 Following World War II, the Federal Housing Admini-
stration created policies that facilitated homeownership for the masses, 
and the GI Bill and Veterans Administration’s home loans provided vet-
erans financial assistance for gaining an education and buying a home.74 
However, these policies precede the 1968 Fair Housing Act.75 Thus, 
when Whites were seizing government-provided opportunities, Blacks 
were blocked from capitalizing on them due to homeowners’ refusals to 
sell, banks’ refusals to give mortgages to Blacks or in black neighbor-
hoods, and the simple exclusion of Blacks from such housing and educa-
tional programs.76  
The modern wave of increased homeownership was not the first 
major governmental housing policy that overwhelmingly benefited white 
families. In 1862, the federal government passed the Homestead Act, 
which gave out 160 acres of “free”77 land for people to raise a family, 
build wealth, and create opportunities for their children.78 Some esti-
mates calculate that a quarter of the white adult American population is a 
descendant of a Homestead Act recipient and thus a beneficiary of a ra-
cially exclusive federal housing policy.79 All the while, black Americans 
never received their forty acres and a mule or a comparable tool to build 
wealth following the end of slavery.  
Even current housing policy benefits the families of wealth-rich 
persons and yields to racial discrimination and racist consumer prefer-
ences. For example, current housing policy requires new homebuyers to 
make a down payment of 20% of the home price.80 By paying such a 
great portion of the home price, a person avoids paying private mortgage 
insurance (which is equivalent to approximately 0.75 percent of the loan) 
  
 73. Id. (“In fact, as a result of the tremendous postwar economic prosperity and public poli-
cies promoting middle-class homeownership, today inheritances are commonplace for middle-class 
families.”). 
 74. Id. at 190.  
 75. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619).  
 76. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 108–09; see also Census Report: Broad Racial Disparities 
Persist, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 14, 2006, 12:01 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15704759/ns/us_ 
news-life/. 
 77. By “free,” we mean that the land was given without to the exchange of money from the 
recipients.  
 78. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 190. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 111–12.  
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and secures a lower interest rate.81 Steep initial prices provide great bar-
riers to homeownership for those with college debts and parents who do 
not offer to pay all or a significant portion of the down payment—in 
other words, those without access to transformative assets.82 Upon ac-
quiring adequate funds to buy a home, racial discrimination in securing a 
mortgage often results in a barrier, if not complete, at least a higher cost 
barrier.83 Consistently, black families with similar credentials to white 
families are rejected; one study showed that lending institutions deny 
Blacks home loans eighty percent more often than similarly situated 
Whites.84 And, overall, Blacks’ interest rates are 0.3% higher than 
Whites.85 
Finally, upon securing a home, black families (living in areas that 
are more than ten percent black) find that their home equity does not 
appreciate at near the same level as if they lived in a nearly all white 
neighborhood.86 Their home value appreciates at an 18% lower rate than 
homes in white neighborhoods, because by and large, Whites will not 
buy a home in a black neighborhood.87 Therefore, the demand for a home 
in a black neighborhood is limited to black families (and possibly other 
minorities) who have the requisite funding, rather than the entire popula-
tion, including Whites, who have a greater ability to buy homes.88 Thus, 
the primary source of wealth—homeownership89 and home equity—
accrue to black homeowners at a significantly lower rate, which in turn 
limits the quality of the schools in those areas as well as the assets that 
families can further provide to their children.90 
The impact of intergenerational wealth, which has accrued and con-
tinues to grow as a result of discriminatory practices and policies, dem-
onstrates that, although strides in education and income are improving 
  
 81. Id. at 112. 
 82. Id. at 111–19 (describing the vast difference in help securing the down payment for first 
homes between black and white families).  
 83. Id. at 111. 
 84. Id. at 109–10.  
 85. Id. at 111. 
 86. Id. at 120–21. 
 87. Id. at 122 (“The pool of potential buyers is no longer 100 percent of the affordable market, 
because for all practical purposes potential white buyers shun such neighborhoods. The potential 
buyers are now mainly other black Americans who can afford the home and possibly other minori-
ties.” (footnote omitted)). 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 43 (“[F]or families in the middle three-fifths of America’s net worth distribution, 
ranging from $1,650 to $153,000, equity in their principal residence represents 60 percent of their 
wealth.”). 
 90. Id. at 53 (“Everything else being equal, blacks accrue only $1.98 in wealth for each addi-
tional dollar earned, in comparison to $3.25 for whites, so that, net of all other factors, the average 
black family earning $60,000 possesses $76,000 less wealth than the average white family with the 
same earnings. The most dramatic difference is the wealth effect of homeownership, which is worth 
about $60,000 more for whites than blacks. The evidence bolsters my core argument that the way 
homes are bought and sold, where they are located, and how the market values them provides a 
contemporary foundation for racial inequality.”). 
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the current reality for some black Americans, many Blacks are left in the 
dust compared to their white counterparts who are able to maintain and 
raise their social status91 precisely because of racial advantage in a vari-
ety of forms.92 Plain and simple, white students are statistically more 
likely to have already received greater opportunities from their families 
and are more likely to receive greater future opportunities by utilizing 
wealth that is unparalleled among Blacks.93  
In fact, research on students at twenty-eight elite undergraduate in-
stitutions—the very kinds of institutions that serve as feeder schools for 
law schools—reveals that these institutions’ multiracial students, black 
immigrant students, and especially black American students with long 
term roots in the United States (otherwise known as legacy Blacks94) are 
significantly disadvantaged in terms of various SES indicators when 
compared to their white peers at the same elite institutions. For example: 
Recent findings from a study of students at twenty-eight colleges and 
universities reveal that, while only seventy percent of fathers of [im-
migrant] Blacks and 55.2 percent of fathers of legacy Blacks were 
college graduates, 85.7 percent of white first-year students were col-
lege graduates; similarly, while only 43.6 percent of the fathers of 
[immigrant] Blacks and 25.3 percent of the fathers of legacy Blacks 
had advanced degrees, 56.7 percent of the white fathers in the group 
had advanced degrees.95 
  
 91. Id. at 10 (“Many of the families I spoke to relied on transformative assets to acquire their 
class standing, social status, homeownership, the kind of community they live in, and their children’s 
schooling.”).  
 92. Id. at 13 (“Many whites continue to reap advantages from the historical, institutional, 
structural, and personal dynamics of racial inequality, and they are either unaware of these advan-
tages or deny they exist. Black Americans in particular pay a very steep tax for this uneven playing 
field and outcome, as well as for the denial of white advantage.”); see also id. at 114 (“In effect, 
young white families possess an advantage in housing markets and homeownership because their 
parents’ economic livelihoods and ability to accumulate wealth were untrammeled by race in previ-
ous generations.”). 
 93. Id. at 40 (“A further analysis of this already disturbing data discloses imposing and pow-
erful racial and ethnic cleavages. In 1999, 26 percent of all white children grew up in asset-poor 
households, compared to 52 percent of black American children and 54 percent of Hispanic chil-
dren.”).  
 94. The term “legacy Blacks” applies to African-Americans who come from families in which 
all four grandparents descend from black American slaves. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 
1149 n.27. 
 95. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1190 (citing Douglas S. Massey et al., Black Immi-
grants and Black Natives Attending Selective Colleges and Universities in the United States, 113 
AM. J. EDUC. 243, 257 tbl.3 (2007)); see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., THE SOURCE OF THE 
RIVER: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF FRESHMEN AT AMERICA’S SELECTIVE COLLEGES AND 
UNIVERSITIES 30–31 tbl.2.5 (2003). Among the schools included in the study were the following (in 
alphabetical order): Barnard College, Bryn Mawr College, Columbia University, Denison Univer-
sity, Emory University, Georgetown University, Howard University, Kenyon College, Miami Uni-
versity-Oxford, Northwestern University, Oberlin College, Pennsylvania State University, Princeton 
University, Rice University, Smith College, Stanford University, Swarthmore College, Tufts Univer-
sity, Tulane University, University of California-Berkeley, University of Michigan, University of 
North Carolina, University of Notre Dame, University of Pennsylvania, Washington University in 
St. Louis, Wesleyan University, Williams College, and Yale University. 
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Admittedly, these statistics reveal a generally more privileged group in 
the United States as a whole, but such racial differences in educational 
attainment among this more privileged group stand separate and apart 
from the eliteness of the schools attended by the students’ fathers, a fac-
tor, which for the reasons described in Part I.A., are far more likely to 
slant in favor of white students.96  
Additionally, the same study of twenty-eight elite institutions re-
vealed that black students at these schools were more likely than their 
white peers to come from families that were earning less as middle-
income families and that black students also were more likely than their 
white peers to be experiencing many of the factors related to coming 
from poverty. Specifically, the study showed “that only 23.8 percent of 
black immigrant families and 25.5 percent of African-American fami-
lies” with students at the elite institutions “had an income over $100,000 
as compared to 52.9 percent of white families, for whom fewer mothers 
were working outside of the home.”97 Furthermore, “whereas 15.7 per-
cent of the black immigrant families and 19.5 percent of the African-
American families in the twenty-eight college study had ever been on 
welfare, only 5.3 percent of the white families had ever been on wel-
fare.”98  
Lastly, studies show that black and white students experience sig-
nificantly different advantages with regard to homeownership, a fact that 
should come as no surprise given Shapiro’s accounting of institutional 
and attitudinal discrimination against Blacks in housing. For example, 
the same “study of the black and white students at select elite colleges 
revealed that, while only 71.4 percent of black immigrant families and 
73.7 percent” of legacy Black families in the study “owned a house as 
opposed to renting (a relatively elite group compared to average Ameri-
can families), 93.8 percent of white families owned one.”99 Second, and 
more importantly, the study showed that, even among this elite group, 
Blacks were at a significant disadvantage in terms of wealth through 
assets, as the average value of the homes for the black immigrant fami-
lies was $220,600 and the average value of the homes for the legacy 
Black families was $193,200 compared to the average value of the 
homes for the white families at $327,400, a difference of more than 
$100,000–$130,000 for both groups.100  
  
 96. See supra Part I.A. 
 97. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1190–91 (citation omitted); see also Dorothy A. 
Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1469, 1501 (1997) (highlighting that black married couples are more likely to be equal wage 
earners). 
 98. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1191–92 (citation omitted). 
 99. Id. at 1192 (citation omitted). 
 100. Id. 
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Such stark differentials in wealth indicated by these studies as well 
as the research by Shapiro and others on intergenerational wealth demon-
strate that Sander’s attempts to compare occupation- and education-
indicated, high-SES Black persons to high-SES White persons without 
any consideration of real wealth distorts the reality of societal advantage 
and privilege and thus distorts the results of such studies.  
II. WHAT’S RACE GOT TO DO WITH IT? A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR 
SANDER’S SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS AGAINST RACE-BASED 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION  
In addition to our concerns about Sander’s measures of class and SES, 
we also have several substantive responses to Sander’s push to replace 
race-based affirmative action with class-based affirmative action. Apart 
from the practical reasons presented above, there are numerous policy 
reasons why Sander’s proposal to do away with race-based affirmative 
action lacks merit. Specifically, we respond to Sander’s misunderstand-
ing of the benefits of diversity, his failure to recognize the raced implica-
tions of “neutral” admissions criteria, and his underestimation of the ef-
fects of contemporary racism. 
A. Understanding Race, Grutter, and the Benefits of Diversity 
As an initial matter, we believe that Sander misunderstands the 
benefits of diversity in articulating his arguments for class-based affirma-
tive action and against race-based affirmative action. To begin, by alleg-
ing that law schools pay little attention to the actual diversity contribu-
tions of students of color,101 Sander misses the objective of race-based 
affirmative action. The purpose is not to expose white students to the 
minority opinion.102 The purpose is to break down racial barriers between 
students, reduce stereotypes, and create enhanced learning as a result of 
cross-racial interactions.103 Such results help white students, who have 
likely lived highly racially segregated lives,104 to learn that there is not 
one minority opinion (and vice versa).105 Furthermore, a critical mass of 
racial minorities improves minority students’ educational experience 
because it allows individual students to hold less of the burden (that 
white students do not have) to educate inquisitive and unknowing white 
  
 101. Sander, supra note 1, at 665–56. 
 102. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
 103. Id. at 330.  
 104. SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 143 (referencing GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: 
CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF RESEGREGATION 34 (2001)) (“A recent study on school segrega-
tion reports that ‘white students are by far the most segregated in schools dominated by their own 
group.’ Whites on average go to schools where 80 percent of the students are white. In comparison, 
blacks and Latinos attend schools where a little over half of the students are black or Latino.”)  
 105. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
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classmates about race106 and allows minority students to focus on their 
own education. 
The interest in breaking down stereotypes through a critical mass of 
racial diversity continues to provide public benefits long after students 
graduate. Multinational firms support race-based affirmative action be-
cause they desire a well-educated workforce that includes employees of 
all races who, through prior exposure to diversity, have an ease and fa-
miliarity with working in diverse groups.107 Moreover, major corpora-
tions and the military have expressed a great need for a well-educated, 
racially diverse workforce.108 This is due in part to the finding that het-
erogeneous workgroups produce better outputs.109 
This interest in breaking down stereotypes and creating a robust ex-
change of ideas is not furthered by the presence of low-SES students, 
that is, if we accept Professor Sander’s emphasis on characteristics that 
distinguish low-income students from students of color. Indeed, we take 
issue with several of Sander’s problematic arguments for why class-
based affirmative action is better than race-base affirmative action: his 
arguments that students who receive class-based preferences can remain 
invisible, are less likely to be stigmatized, “may not even be aware that 
they have received a preference,” and are less likely to engage in “group 
self-segregation.”110  
First, Sander’s argument that the ability to remain invisible is a 
benefit of class-based affirmative action111 is tantamount to arguing that 
black racial passing as white is a healthy act with no psychological or 
material consequences. The very point and benefit of diversity, including 
class or SES diversity, is that students see, hear, acknowledge, accept, 
and embrace differences and learn from each other by listening to and 
respecting the views of others whose opinions and analyses may differ 
from their own because of differing backgrounds and life experiences. 
Because economic background can be invisible, and students are not 
readily identifying themselves as low-SES as Sander claims and Mala-
mud warns,112 there is not as great of a broadening of perspective intro-
duced by low-SES students. It follows that having a critical mass of in-
visible low-income students in the class would not, based on Sander’s 
arguments, help to challenge stereotypes or facilitate better interpersonal 
skills. Furthermore, even now with race-based affirmative action, “no 
  
 106. Id. at 319 (discussing the impact of having a critical mass of racial minority students in 
that it allows students to not feel obligated to serve as racial spokespersons). 
 107. See id. at 330–31. 
 108. See id. (citing the amici from the business and military community in support of race-
based affirmative action). 
 109. See id. at 330.  
 110. Sander, supra note 1, at 665–66. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.; see also Malamud, supra note 14, at 1886–88. 
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one can readily tell which [students] have received a preference.”113 That 
some students think they can or, worse, assume that all black students 
must have benefited from a preference is not an issue that we should shy 
away from, but rather challenge. As educators, it is fair to say we have a 
responsibility to teach students not to paint all members of a group with a 
broad brush of stereotypes simply based on their racial background. 
Second, as one study conducted by Professors Angela Onwuachi-
Willig, Emily Houh, and Mary Campbell has shown, racial minorities do 
not feel stigmatized by affirmative action, either internally or exter-
nally.114 The findings of another study by Professor Deirdre Bowen fall 
in line with the Onwuachi-Willig, Houh, and Campbell study about the 
stigma argument.115 Thus, contrary to what Sander asserts, the stigma 
argument does not necessarily hold water. Even if the stigma argument 
does carry weight, it is not admissions preferences per se that stigmatize 
students, but rather the negative stereotypes and associations that attach 
to students’ identity groups that stigmatize. As Erving Goffman’s theory 
of stigma explicates, stigma is both a precondition to and consequence of 
being a “non-normal”—where “normal” status is defined and perpetuated 
by the very privileges, social and otherwise, that attached to such 
status.116 The stigmatized individual is one who “possesses . . . an unde-
sired differentness from what we had anticipated.”117 For example, On-
wuachi-Willig, Houh, and Campbell found in their study that groups that 
were not negatively stereotyped within the educational context, such as 
Asian Pacific Americans, were not presumed by student subjects to bene-
fit from affirmative action, even in cases where they were actually in-
cluded in affirmative action programs.118 Or as Professor Christopher 
Bracey has explained, students are only “stigmatized” by affirmative 
action if their racial group is already generally stigmatized in that manner 
in society; the actual facts do not matter.119  
More so, we, as an academic legal community that relies so heavily 
on factors such as the LSAT, stigmatize students with our words and 
  
 113. Sander, supra note 1, at 666. 
 114. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Emily Houh & Mary Campbell, Cracking the 
Egg: Which Came First—Stigma or Affirmative Action?, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (2008) 
(finding that “1) minimal, if any, internal stigma felt by minority law students, regardless of whether 
their schools practiced race-based affirmative action; 2) no statistically significant difference in 
internal stigma between minority students at affirmative action law schools and non-affirmative 
action law schools; and 3) no significant impact from external stigma”). 
 115. See Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment 
Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1198–99, 1223–25 (2010) (“Underrepresented mi-
nority students in states that permit affirmative action encounter far less hostility and internal and 
external stigma than students in anti-affirmative action states.”). 
 116. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 2–5 
(1963). 
 117. Id. at 5.  
 118. Onwuachi-Willig, Houh & Campbell, supra note 112, at 1344–45.  
 119. Christopher A. Bracey, Getting Back to Basics: Some Thoughts on Dignity, Materialism, 
and a Culture of Racial Equality, 26 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 15, 39 (2006). 
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rhetoric about deservingness based on LSAT scores (which Sander never 
acknowledges as a factor in favor of high-SES students).120 Consider this 
one true story, a story which we are confident other minority law profes-
sors, low-SES law professors, or minority and low-SES professors could 
recount.  
Law students at an institution are engaged in intense debates about 
rankings and admissions. During this debate, a white, low-SES student 
approaches a minority law professor to discuss the discussions within the 
law school. He feels conflicted. The white, male student knows that he 
had among the lowest, or perhaps the lowest, LSAT score of any student 
in the law school. He has performed well in law school and wants to con-
test the validity of the LSAT to his classmates. He knows that he belongs 
in the law school. He also wants to respond to attacks on minority stu-
dents as the persons responsible for lower rankings. He knows that peo-
ple are attributing low scores to minority law students that he himself and 
another white friend had. He wonders whether he should out himself. In 
fact, he never does. He never speaks out. He remains silent. 
Contrary to what Sander thinks, it was not any preference that this 
low-SES, white student received that made him feel stigmatized. Inter-
nally, he knew that he had earned his spot. He also did not feel any ex-
ternal stigma, as he felt no burden from students’ doubts about him or 
mistreatment of him; in fact, no students doubted him precisely because 
he is white. What made him feel stigmatized, if anything, was the rheto-
ric about who belonged based on LSAT scores. More than its revelation 
about stigma, this student’s story highlights the problems with Sander’s 
identification of invisibility as a positive. Because this low-SES, white 
student could remain invisible, his classmates never had the opportunity 
to learn from him in a way that could have challenged their blind accep-
tance of the factors currently used during law school admissions proc-
esses. 
Additionally, Sander’s point about group self-segregation is just 
plain disturbing.121 Ask any random, racially mixed group of law school 
graduates from a predominantly white institution who their closest 
friends from law school are, and you will likely find that the racial mi-
nority students have the more diverse group of law school friends; white 
law students are more likely to have a group of close friends who also are 
white. The fact is that racial minority students at predominantly white 
institutions cannot self-segregate. It is impossible to function within a 
predominantly white law school as a minority student and not interact 
with students of different races. That students of color may eat lunch 
together or have a party together is not group self-segregation, that is, 
  
 120. See infra Part II.B. 
 121. See Sander, supra note 1, at 666–67. 
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unless one also wants to identify the all-white lunch tables and all-white 
parties, too, as group self-segregation. Unfortunately, the only time that 
racial groups seem to bother people in school settings is when it is mi-
nority students who are together. Very few people ever question the all-
white tables or all-whites groups that are surrounding the minority tables 
or group or having their own parties.122 That Sander would identify group 
self-segregation as an argument against race-based affirmative action 
only highlights the importance of racial diversity among both the stu-
dents and the faculty, as minority students and faculty are more likely to 
impart these important lessons about double standards in looking around 
at “segregated” groups to their white peers. 
Finally, we respond to Sander’s argument that low-SES students are 
worthier beneficiaries of affirmative action because their level of disad-
vantage is more accurately determinable than that of black students be-
cause class status more fully conveys privilege than skin color.123 As one 
example of his point, Sander points to the overrepresentation of first and 
second generation black students from Africa and the Caribbean at col-
leges and universities, asserting that multiracial students and black Afri-
can and Caribbean immigrants should be considered demographically 
distinct from black descendants of American slaves124 (referred to as 
legacy Blacks125 or ascendants).126  
First, we reject Sander’s contention that low-SES students are wor-
thier beneficiaries of affirmative action than minority students because 
their disadvantage is more determinable. It is a misnomer to state that 
SES preferences are based on individual circumstances, whereas race is 
based on group membership; thus, the former are more just.127 SES pref-
erences are based on group membership in that one does not have to 
show that she ever actually suffered from being in that class. In that way, 
race is also based on group membership. In order to be based on individ-
ual circumstances, people would need to show that they individually 
have been harmed by low-SES. 
  
 122. See BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, “WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER IN 
THE CAFETERIA?” AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 52 (1997) (discussing how questions 
regarding seating at lunch tables are generally framed). 
 123. Sander, supra note 1, at 664–66. 
 124. Id. at 665. 
 125. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1148–49. 
 126. Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and the 
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to those that “personally experienced America’s racially discriminatory history their entire lives or 
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But, while we do not agree with Sander’s larger point about who is 
a “worthier” affirmative action beneficiary, we do agree that groups of 
black students should be distinctly considered based on national origin 
and interraciality due in part to the fact that multiracial students and 
black immigrants generally tend to have greater privilege than legacy 
Blacks.128 We also agree that the presence of multiracial students and 
black immigrants in elite law schools when classified as simply “black” 
overestimates the presence of legacy Blacks.129 Finally, we contend that 
it is important, especially for remedial purposes, to ensure that racial 
diversity includes greater numbers of legacy Blacks.130 
However, we do not think that law schools should exclude multira-
cial and black immigrant students from their race-based affirmative ac-
tion plans. Because racial stereotypes of black people do not entirely 
exclude multiracial and black immigrant people,131 many of the interests 
served by including legacy Blacks in race-based affirmative action plans 
also are furthered by the presence of multiracial and black immigrant 
students.132 Indeed, race-based affirmative action for legacy Blacks is 
supported in part because it counteracts the external and internal factors 
that hinder the success of affirmative action beneficiaries (such as race 
discrimination and stereotype threat, respectively). Because multiracial 
students (if they identify as black or part-black) and black immigrant 
students are often subject to the same stereotypes as legacy Blacks, they 
also are at risk of suffering the effects of race discrimination and stereo-
type threat.133 Furthermore, while some black immigrants, particularly 
first generation, voluntary immigrants, do not tend to suffer from stereo-
type threat, voluntary black immigrants and their descendants are not 
forever exempt from bearing the weight of the effects of societal anti-
black discrimination; while black immigrants are often able to proceed 
successfully with their goals unencumbered by cultural stereotypes that 
often hinder legacy Blacks, the advantage of the immigrant perspective, 
which allows them to distance themselves from black American stereo-
types as well as compare their situation not to white Americans but to 
their life back home, starts to give way after the very first generation.134 
Thus, the advantages gained by higher education for black immigrants 
  
 128. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1165–79. 
 129. See id. at 1144–45 (discussing the diverse backgrounds of “Black” students admitted to 
law schools); see also Brown & Bell, supra note 124, at 1245 (arguing that the percentage of “As-
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 130. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1162–63. 
 131. Brown & Bell, supra note 124, at 1241.  
 132. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 1180–1207 (arguing that legacy Blacks, as well as 
black immigrants and multiracial students, serve the purposes of race-based affirmative action by 
advancing diversity and social justice). 
 133. Id. at 1187–88. 
 134. See id. at 1195, 1198 (discussing the impacts of cultural assimilation and stereotypes on 
immigrants). 
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may not curtail the future detrimental effects of racial stereotypes and 
stigma on their descendants. 
Moreover, race-based affirmative action, which includes multiracial 
and black immigrant students, also benefits Whites. The presence of mul-
tiracial and black immigrant students and their interaction with white 
students in the classroom may help to counter Whites’ stereotypes of not 
only that particular subgroup of Blacks, but Blacks in general. Such an 
environment allows Whites to develop greater cultural competence and 
become better prepared to work with co-workers from different back-
grounds.  
Regardless, the current lack of precision in beneficiaries of race-
based affirmative action in law school admissions is not a fatal flaw; a 
more appropriate approach is to reform race-based affirmative action. 
For example, one of us has urged the required inclusion of ra-
cial/ancestral heritage background essays in admissions processes for all 
applicants. In such an essay, an applicant who is a legacy Black could 
describe discrimination that she has faced in American society, and a 
black immigrant applicant could describe the challenges in light of her 
circumstances.135 Such a procedure would allow an admissions commit-
tee to gain a greater understanding of who an applicant is, including her 
privileges and disadvantages; the challenges she has personally faced; 
how far she has come; and whether her admission will advance the 
school’s mission.136 
B. Failing to Understand the Racial Implications of “Neutral” Admis-
sions Criteria  
In addition to articulating arguments that display a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the benefits of diversity, Sander fails to discuss and 
critique many important admissions criteria that work to the advantage of 
high-SES students and disadvantage of low-SES students. Although 
Sander highlights current admissions criteria that slant in favor of high-
SES students, such as legacy preferences, the lack of accounting for 
grade inflation at private colleges, and preferences for “interesting” re-
cords,137 he does not acknowledge all of the criteria that can work to dis-
advantage low-SES students during the law school admissions process, 
including rather prominent criteria. One of the most startling omissions 
in Sander’s list of factors that negatively impact low-SES students is the 
LSAT. That Sander excludes the LSAT itself from a list of items that 
may privilege higher-SES students is shocking. Numerous studies reveal 
that the results of exams like the LSAT correlate very highly with paren-
  
 135. Id. at 1220–24. 
 136. Id. at 1221–24. 
 137. Sander, supra note 1, at 658–59. 
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tal income.138 Also, basic common sense would require including the 
LSAT on any list of high-SES advantages in the admissions game, given 
that the preparation courses that help many students raise their LSAT 
scores by an average of 7 points costs over $1,000–$2,000 and that some 
students have the privilege of having the resources to hire private tutors 
for the LSAT.139 Yet, Sander never discusses the LSAT, which plays a 
huge role in the admission process, as one of the disadvantages to low-
SES students.  
Additionally, Sander attacks the “interesting factor” in admissions 
decisions as being anti-low SES, but in so doing, he does not consider 
how such a factor may be used to recognize the contributions from 
groups that have been historically discriminated against in society.140 The 
interesting factor not only may assist racial minorities, but also would 
allow white low-SES students to be viewed more holistically and favora-
bly than if the admissions committee considered only LSAT and UGPA. 
A broad conceptualization of the interesting factor should not be seen as 
an impenetrable barrier for low-SES students, as it may include student 
involvement in popular, mainstream activities, such as student govern-
ment, and non-popular or specialized school and community organiza-
tions. In addition to not harming low-SES students, the interesting factor 
may allow greater diversity of groups that have been historically dis-
criminated against. Particularly, “interesting factors” may include leader-
ship positions in intercultural organizations such as black student organi-
zations, feminist organizations, and GLBTQ organizations. Activity and 
leadership in such groups enriches the campus experience for many and 
provides an outlet for minorities and allies of all types to improve a cam-
pus they perceive as hostile to their group. Consequently, although the 
interesting factor may work to benefit high-SES students whose privi-
leges and connections make Capitol Hill internships or knowing several 
languages more likely, such non-standardized criteria also allow other 
types of diversity to be taken into consideration that are vital for a well-
rounded class and that provide recognition for student involvement that 
is local and non-cost prohibitive.  
Finally, Sander’s critique of admissions criteria does not acknowl-
edge the role of race in American society. A difference in average LSAT 
scores between black and white students does not delegitimize the pres-
  
 138. See Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1630 (2003); see 
also Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative 
Ideal, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 987–88 (1996) (discussing the relationship 
between SAT scores and parental income). 
 139. Julie A. Helling, Law and Diversity Program: A Model for Attracting, Retaining, and 
Preparing Diverse Students for Law School, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 561, 565 (2006) (“[M]any 
students take an LSAT preparation course and the typical cost is over $1,000.”); Jerry R. Parkinson, 
Admissions After Grutter, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 159, 163 (2003) (“[T]aking an LSAT preparation 
course improves an applicant’s score by approximately seven points.”). 
 140. Sander, supra note 1, at 659–60. 
830 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:4 
ence of the group with lower scores, harm the student, or serve as an 
accurate indicator of longtime future success. Stating that racial prefer-
ences are equivalent to an increase in LSAT score by seven to fifteen 
points for Hispanic and Black students, respectively,141 should be consid-
ered valid only if the LSAT predicts law school grades, bar passage, and 
the ability to practice law and be a citizen lawyer.142 However, the LSAT 
does not do that work—the LSAT is intended only to predict first year 
grades and is able to do so only at a correlation of 0.40 with a 0.00 being 
no correlation, and 1.00 being a perfect correlation.143 Considering that 
the LSAT is not a strong predictor of success as a lawyer or even as a 
second or third year law student,144 non-GPA and LSAT factors, includ-
ing race, should not be considered a delegitimizing factor in admissions. 
Additionally, it would be telling to see what other factors result in a 
boost to traditional measures of credentials. For example, how much of a 
LSAT score boost do admitted students whose parents attended that law 
school “earn”? While such students would have already received the 
social boost of privilege that leads to a higher likelihood of gaining a 
higher UGPA and LSAT score, how much would admissions officers 
overlook the lower UGPA or LSAT scores of such students?  
Not only does a differential in LSAT score not deny a black stu-
dent’s legitimacy as having earned her spot in the law school class, but it 
also does not harm the student due to a “mismatch effect,” which claims 
that recipients of race-based affirmative action are given such a great 
preference in admissions that it overcompensates for their weak LSAT 
scores and UGPAs such that they are incapable of competing with their 
white counterparts whose scores are much higher.145 The rates of black 
students dropping out of law school, having lower law school GPAs, and 
having higher bar failure rates should not be readily attributable to lower 
intelligence or preparedness, but rather should be considered a possible 
result of racial discrimination and microaggressions encountered by 
black students in predominantly white schools.146 Furthermore, black 
students may be underperforming on ability tests such as the LSAT, law 
  
 141. Id. at 654. 
 142. See Guinier, supra note 7, at 149 (citing the University of Michigan Law School’s study 
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school exams, and the bar exam, due to pressure that a failure may result 
in a perceived stereotype confirmation—a phenomenon known in psy-
chology as “stereotype threat.”147  
Even more egregious than Sander’s unquestioned acceptance of the 
LSAT as an accurate, unbiased predictor of ability to practice law is his 
disregard of the racialized nature of legacy preferences in a country 
where de jure access to predominantly white law schools is barely two 
generations old. Sander’s reference to legacy preferences as unduly bene-
fiting high-SES students148 should not be seen as race-neutral.149 Legacy 
preferences disproportionately benefit white students who are socially 
and economically privileged.150 This non-merit based criterion serves as 
affirmative action for children of alumni.151 It also has a much greater 
likelihood of benefiting white high-SES students due to prior barriers to 
education for people of color and a continued lower graduation rate at all 
levels of education.152 Legacy preferences are not used to remedy past 
discrimination, but rather to maintain the status quo and ensure that their 
beneficiaries maintain their family privilege, which was gained in part 
through direct and indirect oppression.153 While Sander discounts this 
impact as an insignificant factor in law school admissions,154 the recent 
scandal at one university, which was reported to include trading admis-
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 154. Sander, supra note 1, at 654–55. 
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sions for the children of politically powerful people in exchange for jobs 
for current students155 coupled with the statistics that show that the rate 
of white legacy admits at elite undergraduate institutions is often at least 
ten times that of non-white legacy admits, should raise questions.156 The 
role of parental connections, whether it be as an alumni or a politically 
well-connected person, should not be overlooked as a possible racial 
barrier to law school admissions.157 
Finally, as the work of Professors Devon Carbado and Cheryl Harris 
demonstrates, the required exclusion of race from the law school admis-
sions process is not race-neutral and, in fact, negatively impacts racial 
minorities, creating a new racial preference for Whites.158 As Carbado 
and Harris ask, what does it mean to ask a racial minority student, for 
whom race has been central to her life experience, to write a personal 
statement without any reference to race? As Carbado and Harris explain: 
This incentive structure is likely to be particularly costly to applicants 
for whom race is a central part of their social experience and sense of 
identity. The problem is compounded by the fact that the life story of 
many people—particularly with regard to describing disadvantage—
simply does not make sense without reference to race. Consequently, 
should these applicants attempt to transcribe their experiences in 
race-neutral terms, they risk that they will be disadvantaged because 
their lives will be unintelligible to admissions officials and unrecog-
nizable to themselves.159 
C. Recognizing That Contemporary Racism Supports the Need to Main-
tain Race-Based Affirmative Action In Order to Achieve Racial Diver-
sity 
Contrary to Sander’s assertion that the elimination of race-based af-
firmative action would not affect racial diversity if replaced by class-
based affirmative action,160 several studies show that class-based affirma-
tive action results in lower racial diversity, particularly lower black stu-
dent enrollment. This was evident with regard to Sander’s university, 
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UCLA School of Law, following Proposition 209.161 Sander’s reference 
to maintained racial diversity at UCLA School of Law after Proposition 
209162 was not a clear win for all racial minorities, considering that al-
most all of the diversity consisted of two-thirds white and one-third 
Asian American students, with a great decrease in enrollment of La-
tino163 and black students.164 Interestingly, the greatest direct losers in 
removing race-based affirmative action were black Americans, who are 
the primary intended beneficiaries of race-based affirmative action. 
While low-SES white students may suffer from economic disadvan-
tage, they gain great benefits from white privilege. Proposing to replace 
race-based affirmative action with class-based affirmative action will 
shift the beneficiaries of affirmative action to white low-SES applicants 
due to the sheer greater number of poor white students than poor students 
of color. By failing to note the privileges and disadvantages that low-SES 
white students and high-SES black students have, Sander paints an in-
complete picture. As discussed before, high-SES Blacks may have a 
greater amount of income than low-SES whites, but they may not be 
anywhere close to equals when it comes to wealth. Additionally, Blacks 
are still disadvantaged by their race, which serves generally to advantage 
Whites.  
In sum, race and class are not equal forms of status. Being a racial 
minority is not the same disadvantage as being low-SES. Unlike race, 
which often carries physical, immutable characteristics,165 white students 
from low-SES backgrounds are able to makeover themselves in order to 
render their background near invisible to outsiders, especially by gradu-
ate school.166 While attempts at passing (which we do not advocate) as 
economically privileged may be discovered,167 passing in and of itself is 
far more attainable for the majority of economically disadvantaged 
Whites than it is for Blacks. By passing as not economically disadvan-
taged, students from low-SES backgrounds will not suffer external 
stigma for being poor; even if they are “discovered,” they may be ad-
mired for exemplifying the power of meritocracy. Furthermore, white 
persons from economic disadvantage have not suffered the same perva-
sive racial discrimination that Blacks have encountered, and continue to 
encounter, regardless of class. Blacks of all classes suffer racial oppres-
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sion,168 which can be particularly more harmful for dark-skinned Blacks 
than light-skinned Blacks.169 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we perceive numerous defects in Sander’s methodol-
ogy that raise serious questions about the results in his article Class in 
American Legal Education. Even if one accepts all of Sander’s meas-
urements and arguments, the necessary conclusion is not that race-based 
affirmative action should be replaced with class-based affirmative action, 
but rather that class-based means for ensuring diversity also must be em-
ployed in law school admissions processes. More importantly, Sander’s 
arguments, if anything, reveal that our means for measuring merit in the 
admissions processes in higher education, and in law schools specifi-
cally, are not class-neutral at all, but instead class-biased in favor of stu-
dents from high-SES backgrounds. To our minds, such revelations sup-
port an overhaul of the way in which we consider students for admission 
into law schools, not an overhaul of any existing affirmative action pro-
grams. 
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